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THE VALUATION OF CLOSE HELD STOCKS: A LOTTERY
IN FEDERAL TAXATION
By RALPH S. RICE t
The importance of the problem of valuation in federal taxation
has been exceeded only by its neglect. In the estate tax field, par-
ticularly, volumes have been written about the items which are in-
cluded in the net estate, but relatively little attention has been paid to
the problem of translating those items into dollar figures for the pur-
pose of computing the tax. Consideration of the subject has hereto-
fore been limited to general conclusions that valuation is such a sub-
jective process that firm and fixed formulae cannot be invoked to reach
a computation of the dollar value of property for purposes of taxation,1
and a listing of the multiple "factors" which the Commissioner and
the courts have considered in making such a computation.' We have,
in fact, been so busy classifying the "factors" bearing on value that we
have rarely stopped to consider whether Congress (and the Commis-
sioner in the exercise of his rule making power) should substitute firm
legislative standards of value for subjective judgments respecting value
made on an ad hoc basis by the Commissioner and the courts.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the theory under which
determinations of "value" have been left to the largely unicontrolled
discretion of the Commissioner and the courts which directly review
his determination; to review the actual operation of the theory; and
to suggest a practical method of improving the present system of
valuations for Federal tax purposes, particularly with respect to stocks
as to which no market data is available.
A consideration of the problem may properly be initiated by refer-
ence to first principles. It is clear that the amount of Federal estate
t Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
1. Meadow Land and Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 297 (3d Cir.
1941) ; Emerald Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1934) ; James P.
Hooper, 41 B.T.A. 114 (1940) ; Daniel Guggenheim, 39 B.T.A. 251 (1939) ; William
Winder Laird, 38 B.T.A. 926 (1938); James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040, (1928). This
approach pervades many decisions. See Judge Frank's comment in Commissioner v.
Marshall, 125 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner,
127 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1943).
See also U.S. Treas. Regs. 29.111-1 (1941).
2. See 10A MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4-150 (1948);
2 PAUL, ESTATE AND GI=r TAXATION 1212-1345 (1942). There is an excellent com-
pilation of earlier cases respecting "factors" to be considered in valuing stock having
no market price in 103 A.L.R. 955-977 (1936). An illustration of the use of various
factors is found infra, notes 26 to 32, and text.
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and gift taxes should be fixed by what is transferred, the amount of
the tax increasing with the dollar equivalent of the property. Accord-
ingly, if a decedent leaves cash, a partnership interest, stocks and real
estate, it is necessary to establish a dollar figure for the partnership
interest, stocks and real estate. The same problem arises where a gift
of property is involved. Similarly, where a taxpayer exchanges
property for other property, it may be necessary to establish a dollar
equivalent for the property received to ascertain whether he realized
a gain on the transaction for Federal income tax purposes.3
In any case the interpretation of the property in terms of dollar
equivalents is imperative. The bases for such an interpretation neces-
sarily must be artificial in the absence of sale of all items of the
property on the open market at the critical date. In such a case, it is
the duty of Congress and the Commissioner to set out, with such clarity
as circumstances permit, the standards by which this artificial figure
of dollar equivalents shall be established. It is not necessarily a prob-
lem related to "what is value"-a problem which .has received not
infrequent philosophical attention with roughly the same results that
accompanied Pilate's inquiry of "what is truth." It is a practical prob-
lem of what standard will relieve the complexities of tax administration
(which burden not only the Commissioner but the taxpayer and his
lawyer as well), to the maximum extent compatible with fair treatment
for the taxpayer.
The Federal income, gift and estate tax statutes currently reflect
only a disposition to ignore the problem. Instead of meeting the
problem squarely with a considered attempt at solution, Congress has
evaded it by references to "value," one of the most slippery of words.4
The estate tax statutes provide that the tax shall be measured by
3. Valuation for income tax purposes may be important in various circumstances.
See statutory references listed infra, note 7, respecting determination of amounts
received on sale of property; establishment of a "value" for property as of March 1,
1913; valuation of property received or delivered in an exchange; and establishment
of a basis for property received by gift or bequest.
4. The various uses of the word were discussed in a relatively early study by
Bonbright, The Problems of Judicial Valuation, 27 CoL. L. REv. 493 (1927). Illustra-
tions of the elusive nature of the word are manifold. An eloquent and much quoted
analysis of the meaning of the word was made by Judge Frank in rejecting a claim
that a formula for determining "value" based on mortality tables did not result in the
fair value of the property to the taxpayer. He suggested that it would be improper
to adopt an approach which "would preclude a tax on any 'value' which is not almost
certain to correspond with actual enjoyment. 'Value' seldom does so correspond.
The fallacy in that argument stems largely from lack of recognition of the eely char-
acter of the word 'value.' It is a bewitching word which, for years, has disturbed
mental peace and caused numerous useless debates. Perhaps it would be better for
the peace of men's minds if the word were abolished. Reams of good paper and
gallons of good ink have been wasted by those who have tried to give it a constant
and precise meaning." Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1942).
See also notes 36, 37, 55, and 56, infra.
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the "value" of the net estate.' A similar provision is made in the gift
tax statute.6 Under the income tax provisions measurement of tax-
able gains is made on the basis of the "fair market value" of the prop-
erty sold or received.7
The terms have been interpreted in the regulations of the Com-
missioner. With respect to the estate tax, the regulations provide
that "value" means "fair market value"; 8 that stock which is listed or
otherwise has a market shall be valued at the mean average of the
sale prices on the critical date, and if there were no sales then on
the mean average between the sales prices on the nearest date before
and after the valuation date; that if no sales have been made, the mean
between the bid and asked prices may be used; and that where actual
sales or bona fide bid and asked prices are not available, the value of
stocks and bonds is to be determined through reference to certain
specific and "all other relevant" factors.' The formula substantially
reduces speculation respecting stock having a market price, notwith-
standing that an escape clause permits variation in cases where use
of the formula would not result in "fair market value." "o The regula-
tions make specific reference to business interests, notes, cash, house-
hold goods and personal effects. Such references reiterate reliance on
the general concept of "fair market value" and the price which "a will-
5. INT. Rv. CoDn J§ 810, 811(a). §811(k) provides in substance that where
no market price is available for stock . . . "the value thereof shall be determined
taking into consideration, in addition to all other factors, the value of stock or secu-
rities of corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of business which are
listed on an exchange."
6. Id. § 1005: "If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of
the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift." See also § 1002.
7. Id. § 111(b). "The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received." In some cases the "value" of property as
of March 1, 1913 must be ascertained to establish a basis for computing gain or loss
on a subsequent sale. Here the statute (ITT. Rv. CODE § 113 (a) (14)) provides
that the basis for determining gain is "fair market value" and that in determining
such value for stock "due regard shall be given to the fair market value of the
assets of the corporation as of that date." Reference is made simply to "fair market
value" in § 112(c), § 112(d) (2), and § 113(a) (6), dealing with the worth of prop-
erty exchanged; § 113 (a) (2), dealing with the worth of property received by gift;
and § 113 (a) (5), dealing with the worth of property received by bequest.
8. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10(a) (1944) : "The value of every item of prop-
erty includible in the gross estate is the fair market value thereof . . ."
9. Id. § 81.10(c) (1944) : "If actual sales or bona fide bid and asked prices are
not available, then, in the case of corporate or other bonds, the value is to be arrived
at by giving consideration to the soundness of the security, the interest yield, the date
of maturity, and other relevant factors, and, in the case of shares of stock, upon the
basis of the company's net worth, earning power, dividend-paying capacity, and all
other relevant factors having a bearing upon the value of the stock."
10. Id. § 81.10(c) (1944) : "In cases in which it is established that the value per
bond or share of any security determined on the basis of selling or bid and asked
prices as herein provided does not reflect the fair market value thereof, then some
reasonable modification of such basis or other relevant facts and elements of value
shall be considered in determining fair market value."
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ing buyer would pay to a willing seller." " Absolute formulae based
on mortality tables are established to fix the dollar equivalents of
annuity, life, remainder and reversionary interests.12  In general, the
gift tax regulations are similar.'" Regulations respecting "fair market
value" for income tax purposes invite equally speculative appraisals
of "value." "4
The clarity of current standards of value is not increased by the
frequent use of the phrase that "value" is what a willing buyer would
pay to a willing seller for the property, each having a reasonable fa-
miliarity with all the facts. The courts in practice have frequently re-
jected the theory. 5 If there are actual sellers and buyers, the prices
set obviously do control. If there are none, a substitute standard must
be established. If no "value" referable to a market actually exists, we
do not promote analysis of the issue-selection of a substitute standard
-by developing the fiction that we are looking for a "market value"
where it is clear that none exists. What we are looking for is a sub-
stitute for "market value." In practice, the substitute is established by
review of all "relevant factors."
Thus, the search for a standard for transmuting property into dol-
lar equivalents for tax purposes proceeds from generality to generality
without enlightenment; from "value" to "fair market value" to "what
a willing buyer would pay a willing seller" to all "relevant factors."
In the absence of information as to what is "relevant" there are in fact
no standards-excepting the formulae restricting market price of stocks
and use of mortality tables-to control the establishment of dollar equiv-
alents for Federal tax purposes.
The reasons for the Commissioner's failure to be more specific
will be discussed hereafter. Let us first see what has happened and
is happening under current treatment of the valuation problem. The
discussion will center principally on valuation of stock with respect to
which no sales data are available. Space limitations obviously forbid
11. Id. § 81.10(d), (e), (f) and (g) (1944). See also Robertson v. Routzahn,
75 F2d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 1935) and cases cited: "Fair market value is the price in
money or its equivalent that the property will bring at a voluntary sale to a willing
buyer, both the seller and buyer having adequate knowledge of the material facts
affecting the value."
12. Id. § 81.10(i) (1944). The accomplishments of the Regulations in fixing an
administratively feasible and generally equitable method of valuing annuities, life,
remainder and reversionary interests have been substantial and have been approved.
The leading case on the subject is Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943 (2d Cir.
1942).
13. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19 (1939).
14. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.111-1 (1941), reciting that "fair market value"
is a question of fact. §§ 29.112(c)-1, 29.113(a) (6)-1, and 29.113(a) (5)-1 (1944)
refer to "fair market value" without further definition.
15. For example, the courts have sustained claims of a taxpayer that a large
block of stock should be valued at a lesser price than small holdings because dumping
of the stock would depress the market. See notes 75 to 77 and text, infra.
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a discussion of all aspects of valuation; valuation of such stock is rela-
tively frequent; and progress in solving the general problem of valua-
tion may best be attained step by step, through weighing the merits and
demerits of the present system as manifested in a limited area.
CURRENT VALUATION OF STOCKS HAVING No MARKET PRICE
The technique of trial and decision. It requires little citation of
authority to support the conclusion that "value" is a "question of
fact," "8 and it is elementary that the conclusions of the Tax Court '"
on questions of fact are binding on the appellate courts unless clearly
erroneous."8 The Tax Court is thus given almost unparalleled discre-
tion to determine---case by case-what standards shall be followed
for estimating dollar equivalents. In the absence of any direction by
Congress or the Commissioner as to how they should go about finding
dollar equivalents, it might be hoped that it would proceed to establish
a standard by judicial inclusion and exclusion. The Tax Court does
not do so.
A fairly primitive approach to the problem is illustrated in Moses
Mosler,' in which the Board of Tax Appeals encompassed its entire
decision in the following language:
The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $37,841.80 in
estate tax. The petitioners filed their petition for a redetermination
of such deficiency alleging that the respondent erroneously in-
creased the value of 3,600 shares of common stock of the Mosler
Safe Co. owned by decedent.
16. See cases cited at note 1, supra.
17. The valuation question is most often presented to the Tax Court (formerly
the Board of Tax Appeals) upon petition for review of a determination of a deficiency
by the Commissioner. INT. REV. CODE § 272(a) (1). Occasionally the tax is paid
and suit is brought in the District Court or the Court of Claims to recover the tax.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1346 (1948). The comments hereafter made respecting the Tax
Court should be understood to include the actions of the District Court and the Court
of Claims acting in valuation matters. Also, a uniform terminology referring to the
Tax Court is used, although many of the decisions here discussed were made by the
Board of Tax Appeals, predecessor to the Tax Court.
18. The decisions of the Tax Court were given an extraordinary degree of finality
in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), which was followed by John Kelley
Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1945). The doctrine has been qualified by the
1948 amendments to INT. REV. CODE § 1141. Since the amendment, it has been held
that an appellate court may reverse the decisions of the Tax Court when it appears
that they are "clearly erroneous," thus substituting this standard for the more general
rule that administrative findings of fact should not be disturbed where supported by
substantial evidence. Kohl v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Wright-
Bernet, Inc. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1949). As to the general scope
of judicial review in valuation cases before the statute, see Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v.
Commissioner 300 U.S. 37, 39 (1937), in which the Supreme Court said that the
reversal of the Tax Court by the Circuit Court of Appeals "amounted to an unwar-
ranted substitution of the Court's judgment concerning facts for that of the Board.
There was substantial evidence, as appears above, to support the latter's conclusion
and in such circumstances this must be accepted."
19. 16 B.T.A. 762 (1929). See also Catherine E. Richardson, 1 B.T.A. 1196
(1925); Marie H. Kelly, 15 B.T.A. 624 (1929).
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The petitioners are executors and executrices of the estate
of Moses Mosler, deceased, with their principal office in New
York, N. Y. Moses Mosler, the decedent, died January 18, 1922.
At the time of his death he owned 3,600 shares of the common
stock of the Mosler Safe Co. The fair market value of such stock
at the date of death of said decedent was $783.75 per share.
Twenty years later, the approach was scarcely more sophisticated
and certainly no more enlightening. In Martha A. Allison," the finan-
cial history of the company with respect to earnings, dividends and
asset value was set forth in the findings of fact. The complete opinion
on the valuation question follows:
One of the contested issues relates to the fair market value of
the 99 shares of the common stock of the Wilkinsburg Bank owned
by the decedent. . . . We have set forth the evidentiary facts
in our findings of fact. Upon consideration of all the factors
bearing upon the value of unlisted shares, where no sales have
taken place at or approximately near the critical date, we con-
clude the fair market value of the shares in question was $45
per share and have so found as a fact.
Nor are some of the current decisions of the District Court more
enlightening. In Vereen v. Allen 2 the complete rationale of the court
was expressed as follows:
I find the fair market value of said stocks and bonds, as of
the date of decedent's death, to be as follows: Moultrie Banking
Co., $200 per share; Moultrie Cotton Mills, $105 per share;
Riverside Mfg. Company, $150 per share; Moultrie Grocery Com-
pany, $100 per share. Moultrie Hotel Corporation bonds, 25% of
their par value.
The brevity of these cases is not representative of the valuation
process. Most of the decisions are longer; some of them are volum-
20. P-H 1946 T.C. MEm. DEC. ff 46,273 (1946). In Mary E. Cook, 9 T.C.
563 (1947) the question at issue was the valuation of stock in a newspaper company.
The decision was reached in the following terms: "The- stock was closely held at all
times and there are no available records of any sales thereof at or near the valuation
dates. The petitioner produced two witnesses, experienced dealers in securities, who
undertook to value the shares on the basis of the information available to them. They
did not have before them and did not take into consideration the business or financial
condition of the issuing company and its earnings. Based on the evidence as a whole,
we find that the shares in question had a value of $75 each on December 10, 1941 and
on May 29, 1942."
21. 75 F. Supp. 406, 407 (D. Ga. 1947). The decisions of the appellate courts
are often equally unenlightening. For example, the decision in Estate of Warren H.
Poley v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1948) states simply: "The questions
here involve the valuation by the Tax Court of certain shares of estate stock and
failure of that court to apply the blockage rule to the problem of the value of the
shares. It is not our function in this type of case to substitute our conclusions and
inferences for those of the Tax Court. The facts and circumstances furnish a reason-
able basis for the conclusions that body reached."
THE VALUATION OF CLOSE HELD STOCKS
inous.2 2 Few are more enlightening. The usual approach is to in-
clude either in the findings of fact or the opinion a resume of at least
a portion of the evidence. Frequently the opinion will state that evi-
dence on a certain point-book value, net asset value, earnings, balance
sheets and various items relating to business prospects-is relevant
but not controlling. For want of more definitive information these
comments are listed in standard compilations to indicate the type of
matters that will be considered.2" From the summary of the evidence
and the general comments on it, each reader decides for himself what
the motivation of the court might have been. In most cases, the ulti-
mate conclusion as to value is prefaced by a statement that the valuation
is based on all the evidence and a consideration of all relevant factors,
a recital impelled by the requirement of the regulations and the in-
sistence of the courts that all relevant factors must be considered 4
Occasionally, the absence of measurable connection between the evi-
dence received and the result reached is frankly stated.2 5
The shortcomings of this procedure can best be illustrated by a
hypothetical counsel who appeals to the Tax Court to establish the
"value," on behalf of each of several clients, of stock of the same gen-
eral nature for which a general market is not available. He introduces
evidence of all factors which he thinks might be relevant but thinks it
best to address especial attention to the factor most likely to be c6n-
22. See, e.g. James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
23. As indicated in note 2, supra.
24. This process can be seen in almost all of the cases cited in this article. The
durrent approach of the Tax Court to the problem is stated in Elizabeth Bowen, P-H
1948 TC Masm. DFac. 148,094 (1948) : "It has been held to be error, as a matter of
law, to base the estimate of value for purposes of fair market value upon one factor to
the exclusion of other relevant factors. [Citing cases.] In Worcester County Trust
Co. et al. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943), the court disapproved the
method there applied of basing value on the one factor of a multiple of earnings, and
we think that respondent's proposed value runs athwart the adverse ruling in the
Worcester County Trust Company case. It is based upon a multiple of one year's
dividends, and little if any weight is given to any other factors. Alexander Smith
and Sons paid dividends totaling $400 per share in 1941. The average dividends paid
over a seven-year period was $250 per share. In 1942, dividends totaled $250 per
share. In 1941, earnings were unusually high, the highest since 1928, with the excep-
tion of the year 1929. A representative period of earnings and dividends should be
considered so that the estimate of value may not be distorted by the abnormalities of
one year. [Citing cases.] Respondent has given too little weight to the Company's
record of past earnings, past dividends, the cyclical nature of the industry, prospective
earnings, and other factors. Just as earnings are only one of the elements to be con-
sidered in determining the value of stock, so dividends are only one of the factors."
See also Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 220 (10th Cir.
1942).
25. Note for example, Daniel Guggenheim, 39 B.T.A. 251, 293 (1939): "The
basic facts are shown in our findings. Some of the evidence on which they are based
will be referred to briefly; but no attempt will be made to make a complete summary
of all the evidence or to assign to every fact its precise relation to the conclusion
reached". See also Daniel P. Hoover, 38 B.T.A. 387, 390 (1938) ; James Couzens,
11 B.T.A. 1040, 1162-1163 (1928) ; Ann L. Keenan, 4 B.T.A. 1232 (1926) ; Marie H.
Kelly, 15 B.T.A. 624 (1929) ; Charles E. Kimball, P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. 1146,268
(1946). For similar comments, see cases cited at note 36 infra.
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trolling. Since it seems reasonable that the net asset value of the cor-
poration must be a starting point for a valuation, he first emphasizes
that factor. He is surprised to learn from the Tax Court that the real
solution to his valuation problem lies in a capitalization of the earn-
ings of the company.2" Profiting by his experience, he directs primary
attention in his next case to the earnings of the corporation. He then
discovers that the net asset value of the corporation is the proper basis
for ascertaining the "value" of its stock." In his next case, he empha-
sizes these two factors and then finds the decision reaching a result
which accords with book value, which may or may not be synonymous
with actual net asset value.28  In his next trip to the Tax Court he
emphasizes all of the foregoing factors and discovers that the value
is established by reference to occasional and isolated sales,29 or offers
to purchase."0 By now he is convinced that:
Cases can be found in which primary or exclusive emphasis
has been properly placed upon one or the other of almost every
factor which the regulations state are to be considered in the deter-
mination of fair market value.81
Accordingly, he resolves to leave no stone unturned in preparation
for his last case. ' He investigates the fiscal and merchandising history
of the corporation issuing the stock. He compiles information respect-
ing the earnings, dividends and balance sheets of the company for many
prior years. He investigates the percentage of earnings paid out in
dividends and such occasional sales of the stock as there may have been
in past years. He reviews the book value of the assets and the stock;
examines the depreciation rates of the company; has valuation engineers
make a survey of the nature and dollar equivalent of tangible assets
of the company, as well as its intangibles including good will; and
studies the financial status of the corporation, especially with respect
26. Robertson v. Routzahn, 75 F.2d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 1935) : "The market value
of shares of stock, in the absence of a showing that the future will bring a change
in the profits of the company, is largely determined by the earnings in the previous
year"; Commissioner v. Johnson, 51 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1931) ; Blackard v. Jones,
62 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okla. 1944) ; Wishon v. Anglim, 42 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Cal.
1941) ; and Rheinstrom v. Willcutts, 26 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1938).
27. In re Nathan's Estate, 166 F.2d 422, 426 (9th Cir. 1948): "The conclusion
that under certain circumstances the value of stock in a closely held corporation which
has never been sold to the public is to be ascertained solely on the basis of the cor-
poration's net worth, is not without precedent." [Citing cases.] See also Patterson
v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1930) ; A. S. Pendleton, 20 B.T.A. 618 (1930).
28. True v. U.S., 51 F. Supp. 720 (D. Wash. 1943); Frederick A. Koch, 28
B.T.A. 363 (1933).
29. Rogers v. Helvering, 107 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1939).
30. Manufacturers Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1937).
31. In re Nathan's Estate, 166 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1948).
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to bonded indebtedness, working. capital, impairment of surplus, pre-
ferred stock, and the ratio of current assets to liabilities. He con-
siders also the past, present and potential market for the product of
the company, including business on the books; the past, present and
potential competition of the company; the past, present and potential
business outlook generally; the age, competence, salaries and state of
health of the officers of the company; and present and potential plant
capacity. He reflects also upon the percentage of total shares of the
company represented by the stock to be valued and whether there are
any restrictions upon sale of the stock.32  If he follows a suggestion
recently made, he will conduct an investigation of that company equiva-
lent to the investigation of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which frequently uses several investigators over a considerable space
of time to ascertain the financial condition of a company which proposes
refinancing in some form. 3 Each of the foregoing factors will tend to
add to, or detract from, the "value" of the stock. He will accordingly
allocate to each of the factors a plus or minus "value," on a dollar
basis. kfter weighing each of the factors individually, he will weigh
the cumulative effect of the factors adding to or subtracting from the
"value" of the stock. Ultimately, he will reach a dollar figure. Hav-
ing done so, he will repeat the entire process for a representative num-
ber of other corporations in the same business, the stock of which is
traded on the market. This will enable him to show comparative
valuations between the stock to be valued and that traded in the open
market. This factor is considered relevant in all cases and especially
must be considered in estate tax cases under the requirements of Sec-
tion 811 (k). 8 The study will also furnish comparatives to establish
the proper rate for capitalization of earnings.3 ' Having piled guess on
speculation and prediction upon estimate, he presumably will come out
with that "value" which will best suit his clients' purpose while remain-
ing at least potentially acceptable to the Tax Court.
The unpredictability of "value." The perplexities that beset the
Commissioner, the taxpayers and the courts under the present valua-
tion system need little elaboration. It is not merely that there is no
32. The following decisions are illustrative of one or more of the foregoing
factors: James T. Hooper, 41 B.T.A. 114 (1940); Daniel P. Hoover, 38 B.T.A. 387
(1938); Grace S. Stebbins, 1 B.T.A. 1157 (1925); John B. Bryan, P-H 1943 T.C.
MEm. DEC. 1143,208 (1943) ; Herbert L. Johnston, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. 143,296
(1943); Rathbun Fuller, P-H 1942 TC MFm. DEc. 1142,442 (1942); John B.
Waterman P-H 1941 TC Mam. DEc. 141,551 (1941). See also MERTENS and PAUL,
op. cit. supra note 2, and cases cited.
33. See Hamburg, Tax Valuation of Real Estate, Stock, and Good Will, 6 PR=.
of INST. on FED. TAX'N. 145, 158 (1948).
34. Quoted at note 5 supra.
35. As to capitalization of earnings, see notes 69 to 71 infra, and text.
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guide to a negotiated settlement of cases where the Commissioner and
the taxpayer may disagree; but that there is never a case involving
close held stock where the Commissioner, the taxpayer, the Tax Court
or the appellate courts have a standard for determining either the
relevance of factors or the weight to be accorded any of them. It is
not only that the taxpayer must introduce evidence concerning every
potentially relevant factor; but also that the Tax Court must set out
in each case a result for that case alone: a ticket "good for this day
and train only." Thus, to an extraordinary degree, not only does the
Tax Court-not the Congress-make the law, but it makes a separate
rule for each case as it is presented.
The difficulties of ascertaining "value" in the absence of any stand-
ard have not gone unlamented. Occasional Tax Court decisions have
stressed that a result was reached only because the issue of "value" had
to be resolved somehow. 6 Appellate courts have reiterated that a find-
ing of "value" in this context represents little more than conjecture.3 7
In some cases, evidence has been rejected because it was too specula-
36. For example, in Amy H. DuPuy, 9 T.C. 276, 284 (1947) it was said: "The
evidence does not lead irresistably to any amount as the obviously correct value, but,
since a finding of a precise amount must be made, the Court has concluded, after
considering all of the evidence in the case, that the value of the stock on the valua-
tion dates was $1,300 per share." See also James T. Hooper 41 B.T.A. 114, 130
(1940); Daniel P. Hoover, 38 B.T.A. 387, 398 (1938); Henry Waiters, 35 B.T.A.
259, 263 (1937).
There has, in fact, been no patentable improvement in the law of valuation for
the last twenty years. The term "value" is just as elusive today as it was in. 1928,
when the Board said in James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1165 (1928): "The conflict
of opinion, however, and the diversity of reasoning by which such -opinions were
arrived at indicate that the problem of valuation . . . has not yet been developed
so far that any particular method of reasoning in respect of it is authoritative or any
particular class of persons may be recognized as experts. There is likewise no method
of arriving at such value which, so far as our research and briefs of counsel show,
has been established in the law as controlling. The facts and circumstances must be
fully known in each case together with any available evidence of their interrelation
and importance, and from this in its entirety the independent judgment of the Board
must be derived." See also similar comments in cases cited at note 25 siupra
37. See, for example, the decision in Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 493,
946 (2d Cir. 1942) where Judge Frank said: "The truth is that it has different
meanings in different contexts, even in the restricted field of 'tax law.' And there,
as almost always, 'value' involves a conjecture, a guess, a prediction, a prophecy."
In an earlier case the same circuit court, speaking through Judge Learned Hand,
resolved the valuation question in Elverson Corporation v. Helvering, 122 F. 2d 295,
298 (2d Cir. 1941) as follows: "The taxpayer called four experts, the Commissioner
two, and the Board appraised the shares at the same value as that given by the lower
of the Commissioner's experts, though not for the same reasons as he. The value of
the shares depended, as all value does, upon their future earning power, obviously a
highly speculative matter as to which no forecast is much better than a guess. We
cannot say that the figure taken was so unreasonable that we must upset it; an
attempt by us to fix another would not be likely to strike nearer the unattainable
mark." See also Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 1943);
Guggenheim v. Helvering, 117 F.2d 469, 474 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Patterson v. Commis-
sioner, 42 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1930). See also the reference in Helvering v. Safe
Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore, 316 U.S. 56, 66 (1942) to value as an "approxi-
mation derived from the evaluation of elements not easily measured."
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tive, s though it is difficult to see why speculative evidence should be
irrelevant in reaching a speculative result. 9
It should be noted also that the absence of any standard necessarily
makes for uneven administration of the law by the various offices of the
Bureau, particularly in the income tax cases where operations are de-
centralized. Even where administration is centralized in Washington,
the decision of the agent in the field must be accorded great weight in a
matter so completely intuitional as valuation. Uniformity in adminis-
tration suffers accordingly.
Moreover, any decision which cannot be rationalized is more than
usually unpalatable to the loser. This is likely to be particularly true
where a taxpayer loses a case against the Commissioner. If giving
the appearance of justice is an important adjunct to the rendering of
justice itself, the present valuation process leaves much to be desired.
The acceptance by the taxpayer of the decisions of the Commissioner
and the courts on valuation questions may best be described as an in-
voluntary act of faith.
In addition, complaints are not infrequently made by the Tax
Court that insufficient evidence has been presented for its considera-
tion. 4° The risk of the taxpayer in presenting evidence on anything
less than all relevant factors has already been noted. Where all rele-
vant factors must be considered, and there is no standard of relevance,
a trial is likely to become time consuming for the court, exhausting to
the ingenuity and patience of counsel, and disastrous to the pocket-
books of the litigants. In these circumstances, the suggestion that the
investigation of value be made similar to that made by the Securities
and Exchange Commission is not extravagant. The simple fact is that
while the sums involved will seldom justify this kind of investigation,
the present operation of the valuation process contemplates that such
an investigation is feasible in all cases.
The presumption that the valuation of the Commissioner is cor-
rect. In the absence of any standards for valuation, the Commissioner
obviously must make a determination on a primarily intuitive basis-
essentially, what is fair-in each case. When such a decision is made,
38. Daniel P. Hoover, 38 B.T.A. 387 (1938); Reba S. Buchanan, P-H 1941 TC
Mxm. DEC. 141,091 (1941) ; Estate of Jacob Fish, 1 B.T.A. 882 (1925).
39. See Guggenheim v. Helvering, note 36 supra, at 474, where shares were to be
valued in a corporation whose affairs were especially subject to the hazard of specific
delays and risks: ". . it is no more speculative to appraise the proper discounts
for the delays, the risks and the liabilities involved than to appraise the shares
themselves."
40. Charles W. Ballard, 25 B.T.A. 591 (1932); Edward E. Hanscom, 24 B.T.A.
173 (1931); Helen K. Bromley, 16 B.T.A. 1322 (1929).
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it is presumed to be correct.4 Whatever may be the merits of the pre-
sumption in matters concerning objective proof such as receipts and
disbursements of the taxpayer, the value of the presumption loses
weight in a case where a subjective judgment is so patently involved.
Yet reference to the presumption has frequently been made by the trial
and appellate courts.42 The difficulty of the taxpayer may be demon-
strated by an example. In Nathan Lamport 4  the taxpayer claimed
that in reaching an asset valuation figure the Commissioner failed to
make allowance for a mortgage against some of the assets valued. The
Commissioner did not state the basis for his determination, which was
supported by the presumption of correctness. Indeed, it is very doubt-
ful that he could have been compelled to disclose his basis.44 The
Board of Tax Appeals sustained the Commissioner on the ground that
they could not tell what consideration moved the Commissioner and
that for all the record showed the fair market value may have been in
excess of that set by him.45  Moreover, it would be unrealistic to
41. The United States Supreme Court recently insisted that the Tax Court take
"into account the presumption supporting the Commissioner's ruling." Commissioner
v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). See also cases collected at 3 P-H 1949 FED.
TAX SERv. f 23,361. Moreover, under INT. REv. CODE § 1119(a), the burden of proof
in establishing the invalidity of any determination of the Commissioner is, with minor
exceptions, on the taxpayer.
42. The principle was adopted by the Tax Court at an early date in valuation
matters: Jacob Fish, 1 B.T.A. 882 (1925) ; Lucy H. Sturgess, 2 B.T.A. 69 (1925) ;
Horace DeLisser, 2 B.T.A. 102 (1925); James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928);
Albert J. Hopkins, 24 B.T.A. 805 (1931). Se also Brink v. United States, 20 F.
Supp. 849 (D. Mass. 1937); J. K. McAlpine Land and Development Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 126 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1942), and cases cited.
43. Nathan Lamport, 28 B.T.A. 862 (1933).
44. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), holding that there could
be no cross-examination of the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to his process of
decision in a rate case. This determination followed a hearing. Query whether the
same result would be reached in a matter-such as assessment of a tax deficiency-
where no hearing is required and the action of the Commissioner is more adminis-
trative and less judicial. See also other cases cited note 54 infra.
45. Essentially the same principle has been stated elsewhere. In Victor Machris,
P-H 1938 B.T.A. MEM. DEc. if 38,076 (1938) it was said: "It is his determination
that is in issue and not his method of making it. The petitioner is not relieved of the
burden of showing the determination to be erroneous, even though the respondent may
have proceeded upon a wrong theory or employed an incorrect method." See also
Crowell v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1932); Rheinstrom v. Willcutts, 26
F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1938) ; Charles J. O'Laughlin, 30 B.T.A. 1327 (1934) ; Edgar
M. Carnrick, 21 B.T.A. 12 (1930). In cases where the taxpayer has relied on
opinion evidence, such evidence frequently has been discarded and the decision based
on the presumption. National Weeklies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 39 (8th Cir.
1943); Gessell v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1930); A. S. Pendleton, 20
B.T.A. 618 (1930); Richard B. Messer, 27 B.T.A. 556 (1933); Helen K. Bromley,
16 B.T.A. 1322 (1929). In Ruud Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 45 F.2d 63. 65 (3d
Cir. 1930)) inodifybkq 15 B.T.A. 819 (1929), it was said: "No clear evidence was
submitted from which it could be logically concluded that the redetermination was
erroneous, and in the absence of such evidence, the decision of the Board must be
affirmed on this point."
Moreover, the presumption of the Commissioner may sometimes be discarded, as
in Mount v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 550, 552 (2d Cir. 1931), where it was said:
"There must be a limit beyond which the presumptive correctness of the Commis-
sioner's determination may not be stretched in order to defeat a taxpayer." See also
Sioux City Stockyards v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1932). It is some-
THE VALUATION OF CLOSE HELD STOCKS
assume that the Bureau, aware of the vigor with which claims for low
valuations are pressed by taxpayers, does not at least occasionally rely
on that "factor" which will result in a high valuation. An occasional-
and possibly untrue-rumor is heard that in practice the Bureau re-
solves stock valuation problems where no market price is available by
taking the higher of net asset value and capitalization of earnings.
Certainly the expert opinion of the Commissioner on "value" is
entitled to some weight. But the weighting of the scales against the
taxpayer here emphasizes the need for some objective standards against
which the determination of the Commissioner-now almost completely
subjective-may be measured.40  If, as has been suggested, valuation
is ordinarily a compromise process, 47 the ability of the taxpayer to nego-
tiate may be unfairly hampered by the power of the Commissioner to
rely on a presumption that his determination is correct, where there
is no statutory standard by which his exercise of judgment can be
measured.
To what extent decisions of the Commissioner and Tax Court are
find. The proper scope of judicial review of administrative adjudica-
tions has given rise to more uncertainty than almost any other aspect
of governmental administration. The question has been particularly
acute since Dobson v. Commissioner,48 in which the Supreme Court di-
rected that an unusual degree of finality be accorded decisions of the
Tax Court, whether based on "law" or "fact." "
The difficulties of judicial review of the valuations of the Com-
missioner are pronounced because the valuations must be based on
"all relevant factors." Such a requirement invites vagueness on the
part of the Commissioner. If he uses a figure equivalent to asset value,
for example, the Tax Court or Circuit Court of Appeals may conclude
that he did not consider "all relevant factors." " However, if the Coin-
times said that the presumption ceases when evidence is introduced. True v. United
States, 51 F. Supp. 720 (D. Wash. 1943). Under these circumstances the question of
when the taxpayer has introduced sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption is
always present and always unpredictable.
46. See PAUL, STUDIES I N FEnaAx. TAXATION 162 (1937): "No one knows what
the word 'value' means until he is told. The meaning is what the United States
Government chooses it to mean . . . one thing if it is protecting investors, and an-
other thing if it is taking their profits from them."
47. As suggested at 2 PAuL, FEaDERA ESTA'E AND GiFT TAXATioN 1220 (1942).
48. 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
49. See note 18 supra for a discussion of subsequent legislation on the subject.
50. See, e.g., Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Crowell v. Com-
missioner, 62 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1932) ; White and Wells Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d
120 (2d Cir. 1931). See also Wishon v. Anglim, 42 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Cal.
1941), where the court referred to the Treasury Regulation that all relevant factors
must be considered, and reversed the Commissioner in the following language: "The
Commissioner's 'guess' as to value is not controlling here because he ignored the rule
of the Treasury Department above quoted and based his appraisal wholly upon 'asset'
or net value. It is stipulated that the asset value of Mrs. Wishon's stock at the date
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missioner adopts a figure which is arbitrary-in the sense that it is
not referable to any theory or theories-it is obviously more difficult
for the taxpayer to establish that no allowance was made for one factor
or several factors.5 A premium is thus placed on the adoption of a
dollar result unconnected with any standard of "value." In this con-
nection, one practitioner has made a wry comparison between the
Commissioner and the justice of the peace who never was reversed until
he wrote an opinion.5" In fact, the scales are overweighted against a
taxpayer confronted not only with the presumption that the Commis-
sioner's valuation is correct, but also with a dollar valuation not refer-
able to any specific standard. The effect of the present valuation proc-
cess was aptly described in Patterson v. Commissioner 5 where it was
said:
Probably it is true that the holder of such shares must usually
be content with the guess of the Commissioner, because when
property is not sold on an open market where a number of buyers
can establish its value, it will seldom be possible to contradict the
first honest judgment formed.
The valuations of the Tax Court, when considered on appeal, stand
in a stronger position than those of the Commissioner, its judgment
in valuation cases normally being undisturbed. Presumably, being a
fact finding tribunal, the Tax Court is not required to adopt any factor
or combination of factors. Nevertheless, the Board is required to con-
sider the factors, whether adopted or not. Here, too, there may be a
tendency to seek refuge from judicial reversal in the standard recital
that the conclusion is based on all relevant factors. In any event the
writer has seen no decisions in which the Tax Court has admitted in
terms that it has found one factor controlling, or that one or more fac-
tors have been ignored because they had no relevance to the valuation
of her death was $838.55 per share. The Commissioner appraised it at $838.36, a
difference of 19 cents. The stipulated asset value of Mr. Wishon's stock was
$1,023.95, and the Commissioner's appraisal was in the identical amount."
51. This difficulty of the taxpayer is not, however, insuperable. In Patterson v.
Commissioner, 42 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1930) where the Commissioner valued common
stock at $16.36, and the court said: "Had the Commissioner found the value at $16.30,
we think we could divine how he proceeded; for a valuation of the assets at $200,000
would so result. Subtract the preferred stock, $37,000, and the value of the common
shares comes out at $16.30. We cannot account for the added 6 cents, but the
difference is unimportant." Cf. Elizabeth Bowen, P-H 1948 TC MEMa. DeC. ff 48,094
(1948), where it was said: "It is generally recognized by the courts that unlisted
stocks in close corporations lack marketability . . .Respondent's expert testified
that he recognized that this factor should be considered in valuing the Smith Company
stock, but we are unable to recognize any real consideration of that factor by the
respondent." See also cases cited at note 61 infra respecting decisions of the Tax
Court.
52. Van Dyke, Commissioner Unfair to Fair Market Value, 23 TAXES 788
(1945).
53. 42 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1930).
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in question. Of course, under general administrative practice, the tax-
payer would not be permitted to cross-examine the court concerning
whether all factors were in fact considered and if so how much weight
was given to this factor or that. 4 Accordingly the requirement that
'all relevant factors" must be considered avails him nothing insofar
as a possible reversal is concerned. His primary hope is that he can
show that the Tax Court was in error in refusing to apply, rather than
consider, certain factors in reaching the result. Occasionally, as in In
re Nathan's Estate 5 courts have been reluctant to review the conclu-
sions of the Tax Court on this basis. Other courts have looked through
the standard recital that all relevant factors have been considered and
have reversed the conclusion of the Tax Court, presumably on the
theory that they were not considered properly."
Since the findings of the Tax Court are conclusive if supported
by evidence, and the regulations and case law require only that all fac-
tors be considered, the view of In re Nathan's Estate seems to be more
logical. The dilemma which arises here is whether to repose almost
unrestrained discretion in the Tax Court or to permit the appellate
courts to substitute their views as to the proper method of establishing
the dollar equivalents of property for federal tax purposes. It has been
54. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) ; National Labor Relations
Board v. Botany Worsted Mills, Inc., 106 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Cupples Company
Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board, 103 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1939);
National Labor Relations Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F.2d 16 (9th Cir.
1938). In Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593
(1907), the court held that it was improper to examine the members of a tax assess-
ing board as to their exercise of judgment in making an assessment: "This was
wholly improper. In this respect the case does not differ from that of a jury or an
umpire, if we assume that members of the Board are not entitled to the possibly
higher immunities of a judge."
55. 166 F.2d 422, 428 (9th Cir. 1948): "We are inclined to agree with respond-
ent that petitioner, although alleging that the Tax Court 'failed to consider' pertinent
evaluation factors, is in fact charging that the Tax Court 'failed to accept' certain
criteria as being here determinative. The weight to be accorded the various evi-
dentiary factors depends upon the facts of each case." See also Judge Huxman's
dissent in Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 220, 228 (10th
Cir. 1942); Guggenheim v. Helvering, 117 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1941).
56. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943);
Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Newell
v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1933). The determination of the Board of
Tax Appeals was approved in Manufacturers Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d
684, 686 (2d Cir. 1937) where the Board set a value of $256,308.96 for stock and an
offer to buy the stock for $256,309.00 had been made. The Board referred to the
offer only as "entitled some weight." The court said: "The correspondence between
this figure and the valuation adopted by the Board is so nearly exact that the inference
is irresistible that their valuation was arrived at in this way. No other combina-
tion of figures appearing in the record could produce it." Note also the decision in
Sue E. Holmes, 22 B.T.A. 757 (1931) where the Board expressly asserted non-
reliance on the selling price of inactive stock, but judging from other decisions the
Board would have found a higher value solely on basis of asset value and earnings.
Reversal of Tax Court and Board decisions has been most general where specific
theories are involved; e.g. see notes 75 to 77 and 84 to 88 infra and text, where
blockage and transfer restrictions were concerned. The Board has also been reversed
on the ground that the result was reached in an arbitrary and unfair manner. Foss
v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1935).
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inoted that this problem pervades the entire field of administrative law,
including many of the decisions of the Tax Court in matters unrelated
to valuation. The peculiar difficulty of the problem in this context
arises from the almost complete absence of standards of any kind by
which the actions of the Commissioner and the Tax Court can be
measured on appeal.
Appellate review of Tax Court decisions presents still another
difficulty. What happens when the appellate court concludes that the
Tax Court has not given proper consideration to a "relevant factor"?
The standard procedure is to return the case to the Tax Court for
further consideration. 5T However proper this may be in theory, it
presents some difficulties in practice. The appellate courts have fre-
quently admitted that valuation is an intuitional process.5s Neverthe-
less, in specific cases they may say in substance to the Tax Court:
"Deduct something from your dollar result to allow for a transfer
restriction on the stock." The response of the Tax Court might well
be embodied in the following hypothetical reply: "We don't think there
should be any deduction-as we said when the case was here before-
but of course you have the power to review and direct our decision.
So we will deduct something, since you requ'ire it. Of course, you
don't tell us how much, or even how we should approach the problem
of setting a figure. We both understand that you can't do that because
it is almost absolute conjecture. Do you think abiout 10% would be
all right ?"
It is clear that the next figure will not represent the conviction of
the Tax Court-its determination has been rejected. In the absence of
any standard for review, there is a considerable possibility that the
computation will represent a sum thought to be sufficient to achieve an
equality of discontent among the litigants and a probability of affirm-
ance by the appellate court. In this type of problem, the suggestions
made in a dissent by Judge Learned Hand appear persuasive:
The Tax Court has made its guess, and it is the only tribunal
vested with authority to do so. We are now saying that there
was no substantial evidence to support that guess, in which we are
quite right; but we are sending the case back to make another
guess, which in the nature of things we must know will have as
little to rest upon as the first. That seems to me quite beyond
our function; the fact that we should have ourselves fixed a lower
57. See, e.g., Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943); Guggenheim V.
Helvering, 117 F.2d 469, (2d Cir. 1941); Weber v. Rasquin. 101 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.
1939) ; Behles v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Patterson v. Commis-
sioner, 42 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1930).
58. See notes 36 to 39 sztpra and text.
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price-I should also have done so--does not give us authority
to compel the Tax Court to do so.59
However the problem may be resolved, the ultimate decision as to
"value" under the current valuation process seems only remotely
related to the basic problem of ascertaining what standards Congress
had in mind for establishing dollar equivalents of property in Federal
tax cases.
Summary of the problem. The deficiencies in the present valua-
tion process are clear. The immediate cause for the present system of
speculation and conjecture is not far to seek. It arises from the use
of the word "value" as an "anodyne for the pains of reasoning" re-
quired to set out a measurable standard for establishing the dollar
equivalent of property for Federal tax purposes. The term "value"
means what the Commissioner and the courts choose it to mean. In
effect we are saying that the Commissioner shall impose a fair tax in
view of the nature of the property transmitted, but this assessment shall
not be unreasonable; that the Tax Court may say that the determina-
tion is unreasonable; and that the appellate courts may review that
decision. In practice the Commissioner does not state the reasons for
his determination; the Tax Court in review does not state its reasons,
but expresses a dollar result after consideration of "all relevant fac-
tors"; the appellate courts usually rely on the Tax Court decisions but
occasionally reverse on the ground that weight should or should not be
given to a specified factor. It is, under law, a conspiracy of silence.
In our anxiety to permit "play in the joints" in Federal tax valuations,
we have created a system which has no joints because it has so little
structure.
While the valuation process is an example of what Justice Rutledge
has described as administrative fog, rather than administrative exper-
tise, the fog is not self induced. It arises neither from administrative
nor judicial incompetence. In this area, Congress has not merely
delegated to the Commissioner and the courts the power to interpret
Congressonal directions as to the proper standards for establishing
dollar equivalents for property in tax computations, but has commanded
the Commissioner and the courts to establish such standards without
even the most general directions. It is not surprising that the decisions
have been unpredictable. Congress has never spoken on the subject,
except in terms of "value."
59. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 1943).
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PROPOSED SOLUTION
Two preliminary observations should be made in the study of a
proposal to improve the valuation process. First, the deficiencies which
have been noted in the system are not peculiar to a determination of
"value." It has hitherto been noted that uncertainty is evident in many
tax problems, where wide latitude is given to the Tax Court to interpret
Congressional directions which are necessarily stated in general terms.
It has been noted also that this is particularly true in all cases involving
a resolution of so-called questions of fact. The last twenty years have
happily witnessed an awakening sense of realism among those who once
believed that law could be made so definite and certain that adminis-
trative and judicial interpretation would be required only in the nar-
rowest of limits. The appeal for "a government of laws and not of
men" is seldom heard. There are real dangers in trying to set too
many legislative standards for too many things. This should not, how-
ever, deter us from setting firm and fixed standards under which
specified conduct will have a specified result where experience has
demonstrated a breakdown of a purely intuitive approach to such a
problem as the computation of Federal taxes.
Second, no proposal to rationalize the valuation process should
proceed without a review of the merits claimed for the present pro-
cedure. The system seeks its ultimate justification in the fact that
"relevant factors"-management competence, asset value, business
prospects and all the others-may in fact tend to increase or decrease
the worth of close held stock to the owner or a potential buyer. While
the process of weighting the factors is admittedly speculative, it is
apparently assumed that a fair and equitable result may be reached only
by use of intuitive judgment after considering all the factors. It is this
assumption which lies behind the frequent assertions of the courts that
"value" is a matter of fact, not of formula.60 The observation has force,
but it does not tell the whole story. It would be futile to seek a formula
which would in all cases establish dollar equivalents for property as a
simple arithmetical computation; the difficulties of establishing the dol-
lar equivalent of real estate or personal property demonstrate the need
for the exercise of some intuition by the administrators and the courts.
What we ought to try to do is reduce the area of unpredictability so
far as may be consistent with the common understanding of fair treat-
ment for the taxpayer. The first portion of this article has been devoted
to reducing the romantic generalities about the desirability of intuitive
judgments to a specific study of the actual technique of trial and deci-
60. See note I supra.
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sion in cases involving valuation of stock which has no market price.
If experience shows that fair and workable standards can be set in that
area attention may thereupon be directed to creating standards to estab-
lish a dollar equivalent for other types of property. It is submitted that
the demonstrated deficiencies of the valuation process can be alleviated.
Two steps should now be taken to improve the current valuation
process:
1. All reference in the regulations to "all relevant factors"
should be stricken.
2. A specific formula for the valuation of close held stock
should be adopted, based on the asset value of the issuing cor-
poration.
"All relevant factors." The first step in clarifying the valuation
process should be to eliminate all reference in the regulations to "all
relevant factors." This should be done not only with respect to valua-
tion of stock which has no market price, but all other property as well.
The requirement for consideration of "all relevant factors" has been
interpreted in practice to mean that the decision shall not be placed on
any specific factors. It thus becomes an instrument for concealing,
rather than expressing, thought. As a result, the Commissioner and
the courts avoid explaining exactly how they reached their respective
decisions. It may be conceded that the decisions will always be intui-
tive in part and not subject to rational analysis. But the construction
of case law on the subject is not going to progress until the courts fully
express their reasons for decision to the extent that they can be
articulated. 61
Elimination of the requirement that "all relevant factors" be con-
sidered does not mean that any directive need be substituted for it
except in cases where a specific formula is found desirable. Presumably
it is the present intention of Congress that the Tax Court and the ap-
pellate courts must conscientiously study the record and consider all
the evidence in reaching a result. Consonant with the statutes and
decisions relating to Federal tax determinations, that result presumably
should be rejected on appeal only if clearly erroneous on the facts 62 or
if the valuation involved an "error of law." Where the Tax Court has
made an improper valuation in a specific case, it is immaterial whether
the result be attacked as an error of law (in that an improper standard
of valuation is used) or as clearly erroneous on the evidence (because
61. For an example of a more rational decision than those of the Tax Court in
the valuation field see Vale v. DuPont, 37 Del. 254, 182 Atl. 668 (1936).
62. See note 18 supra.
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evidence considered by the appellate court to be compelling was ignored
by the Tax Court). In either event there is ample opportunity for
judicial review, if the reviewing court is prepared to specifically find
error of law or an otherwise clearly erroneous result. Certainly no
useful purpose is served at present by the conclusion of appellate courts
that the Tax Court has not considered a specific factor, when they mean
that it has not applied the factor.
A specific standard for valuation of stock. It is suggested that
the statutes and regulations respecting the valuation of close held stock
for Federal tax purposes remain unchanged in cases where an actual
market is available. Such prices are ascertained by market quotations,
or (in the case of unlisted stock) are based on sales, bids or offers in
arms length transactions at a time reasonably proximate to the valua-
tion date. Thus the initial investigation of the Commissioner and the
Tax Court is, and should continue to be, addressed to market price. If
a market price based on such data can not be determined, the Commis-
sioner and the Tax Court should so state.
However, the foregoing discussion indicates that regulations with
respect to valuation for income, estate and gift tax purposes are inade-
quate in cases where no market price can be established. They should be
amended to provide that the dollar equivalent for close held stock shall
be established by computing the net dollar equivalent of the assets of the
corporation,' including good will and "going concern" value of the
corporation in any cases where it is demonstrated that such value exists.
The total sum should be divided by the total number of shares outstand-
ing to reach the dollar equivalent of each share of stock for Federal tax
purposes. Where different classes of stock are issued, the percentages
of net worth to be assigned to each should be determined upon a reason-
able basis in the discretion of the Tax Court, subject to the usual review.
Under this formula, the imperative need for the exercise of ordi-
nary judgment by a fact finding body in any valuation matter would be
recognized. Ample room for the exercise of discretion exists with
respect to the valuation of the assets. This is particularly true of the
valuation of good will. Flexibility of the formula would be insured by
a clause auth6rizing computation of value on a reasonable modificatiort
of the formula where the use of the formula would result in injustice
63. The net dollar equivalent would be the market-not book-value of the assets.
Occasionally, as in DuPont v. Deputy, 26 F. Supp. 773 (D. Del. 1939), claim has
been made that the capital gain taxes payable on any sale of the assets should also
be deducted, as well as the cost of disposition. Since actual disposition is not con-
templated-the asset value being taken only for the purpose of computing the dollar
equivalent for the stock-no deduction for these items should be permitted. Com-
putation of good will and going concern value is considered in the following section
of this article.
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to the parties. Such clause is currently included in the regulations
respecting stocks having a "value" ascertainable through market price.64
Theory of the proposed formula. The current confusion and un-
certainty in valuing stock which has no market price results in a large
measure from administrative and judicial attempts to ascertain what
the market price of such stock would have been had there been a market
-- what Judge Frank has described as "What-you-could-have-got-
for-it-in-money-if you-had-sold-it." The problems hereafter discussed
concerning the effect of minority stock holdings, blockage, limited mar-
ket for close held stock, values in comparative companies and con-
tractual restrictions on the sale of stock, accordingly must be resolved
under the present practice, since they are all "relevant factors" in deter-
mining market value. These factors, combined with the usual specula-
tion respecting the inherent ability of the corporation to make money
under present and projected business conditions, are the grist from
which the present valuation decisions are ground.
The proposed theory seeks to channel the investigation of value in-
to at least relatively narrow limits; the net asset value of the corpora-
tion. This substitutes a relatively fixed objective for pursuit of the
will-o'-the-wisp of market price in the absence of a market. The result
will be a reasonable approximation of "value," just as "value" based
on stock market quotations (which may be unduly inflated or deflated)
represents an approximation.65
OPERATION OF THE FORMULA
Current use of asset value. The use of asset value as a measure
for the tax is dictated by experience and convenience. Net asset value
has always been considered a major factor in the valuation of close held
stock. On many occasions asset values alone apparently have in fact
been adopted as the measure of "value," 66 although it has been reiter-
64. The regulation is set out at note 10 supra.
65. See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 188, 194 (1937) for an extended
analysis of the subject in which he concludes that stock market quotations do not rep-
resent a proper measure of "value" for tax purposes unless qualified by other relevant
factors. In Strong v. Rogers, 72 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1934) the court reduced a valua-
tion below the market quotation on the theory that a well informed buyer would never
have paid the stock market price.
66. Bank of California v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Patter-
son v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Forbes v. Hassett, 38 F. Supp. 62
(D. Mass. 1941); Henry E. Huntingdon, 36 B.T.A. 698 (1937); Frischkorn Devel-
opment Co., 30 B.T.A. 8 (1934); Melville Hanscom, 24 B.T.A. 173 (1931); P. C.
Pendleton, 20 B.T.A. 618 (1930); George F. Milton, 17 B.T.A. 380 (1929); Robert
L. Holt, 14 B.T.A. 564 (1928); David Weingarten, 13 B.T.A. 249 (1928); Ameri-
can Trust Co., 13 B.T.A. 105 (1928) ; Anthracite Trust Co., 3 B.T.A. 486 (1926) ;
George H. Burr, P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEc. 145,364 (1945) ; Estate of Hogan, P-H
1944 TC MEm. DEc. 1144,109 (1944). See also Hinkel v. Motter, 39 F.2d 159 (D.
Kans. 1930) and Robert H. McNeil, 16 B.T.A. 479 (1929). In many cases asset
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ated that reliance solely on asset values is improper under the rule that
"all relevant factors" must be considered.61 Occasionally litigants have
agreed that asset value shall control stock valuations.68
Use of net asset value superior to capitalization of earnings. It
has generally been accepted that a proper measure of the "value" of
unlisted stock is to capitalize the earnings of the corporation."9 The use
of asset valuation, however, seems more fair, because there is less
opportunity for variation in results. Capitalization of earnings re-
quires two bases. First, the Commissioner must select a period of time
which will reasonably reflect average annual earnings, excluding ab-
normal years. Second, he must select a capitalization rate to be applied
to the earnings. If the business is stable, the rate would normally be
low; if the business is hazardous, the rate would normally be high.
The selection of a reasonable period of earnings and a reasonable rate
is extremely subjective, and no general rules respecting proper rates
for various industries have been adopted."° It is thus difficult to hold
the Commissioner and the Tax Court even to a reasonably objective
standard for establishing "value" under a capitalization of earnings
formula. Accordingly, where capitalization of earnings are used,
prediction becomes impossible. The use of net asset value, while also
subjective in part, unquestionably has more certitude for the adminis-
trators, the taxpayers and the courts.
Ascertainment of good will and going concern value. In some
cases, exceptional earnings demonstrate that the stock is worth sub-
stantially more to the holder than an aliquot percentage of the im-
mediate and measurable assets. In such a case it is apparent that there
may be a good will or going concern value in the corporation. Under
values are accepted where there is no other evidence. See 10A MERITENS, LAW OF
FEmERAL INcomE TAXATION 55 (1948) and cases cited.
The nearest approach Congress has taken toward establishing asset value as the
standard for valuation of stock is in INT. REv. CODE § 113(a) (14), quoted supra note
6, where the commissioner and the courts are admonished to consider the fair market
value of the assets of the corporation as of March 1, 1913 in establishing the basis
for computation of gain on stocks sold on and after that date.
67. Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925 (1st Cir. 1942) ; Weber v. Rasquin, 101 F.2d
62 (2d Cir. 1939); Wishon v. Anglim, 42 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1941); DuPont
v. Deputy, 26 F. Supp. 773 (D. Del. 1939); Margaret Russell Vail, P-H 1940 BTA
MEM. DEc. 140,431 (1940) ; Amy H. Du Puy, 9 T.C. 276 (1947) ; Mary A. Laird,
38 B.T.A. 926 (1938); George D. Harter Bank, 38 B.T.A. 387 (1938); Frank A.
Cruickshank, 9 T.C. 162 (1947) ; Maurice H. Bob, P-H 1945 TC MEM. DEc. 45,195
(1945).
68. See for example, Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), nodi-
fled on other grounds, 1 T.C. 564 (1943) ; Julius G. Day, 3 B.T.A. 942 (1926) ; Jacob
Fish, 1 B.T.A. 882 (1925).
69. As indicated by note 9 supra, consideration of this "factor" is now specifically
required under the estate tax Regulations. A number of cases are collected at 103
A.L.R. 955 (1936); 10A MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 57-61
(1948); 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1287-1293 (1942).
70. Ibid.
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the formula this is added to the other asset values. Establishment of a
dollar equivalent for good will partakes somewhat of the nature of
capitalization of earnings; that is, under current practice normal earn-
ings are allocated to the other assets and the balance of the earnings is
capitalized to establish good will or going concern value. Thus the
Commissioner, in valuing good will, must select a reasonable period to
ascertain average annual earnings, and establish a reasonable rate by
which those earnings are to be capitalized. Under the proposed for-
mula, the Commissioner would make this type of a subjective valuation,
subject to review by the Tax Court and the appellate court. It would
be appropriate to limit his discretion by requiring him to adopt, by
regulation, certain capitalization rates for specified businesses. In any
event, as long as the value of all the other assets may be fixed within
reasonable limits, the possibility of unfairness through use of an im-
proper capitalization rate or an improper period of earnings is mini-
mized under the general formula suggested.
It is not contemplated that the Commissioner shall attempt to
establish a good will value unless the earnings of the corporation are
abnormal. Indeed, the Board of Tax Appeals has refused to sustain
valuations made by the Commissioner on such a basis. 7 ' Accordingly,
while the difficulties in determining the worth of good will are sub-
stantial, the proposed formula restricts such a valuation to the fullest
extent possible. This may be contrasted with the present valuation
process, where the valuation of good will is at least in theory a "relevant
factor" which presumably must be weighed with "all other relevant
factors" in every case.
Minority holdings of stock. It has been suggested by some courts
that the use of asset value to establish the dollar equivalent of stocks
without a market price is improper where the stocks to be valued repre-
sent a minority holding. This conclusion is reached on the basis that
the stockholder has no power to compel the majority interests to
liquidate the stock so that he may receive his proportionate share of
the assets.7 2 No allowance for the factor is made by the formula. The
problem is most frequently encountered in the estate tax case. There,
it seems absurd to assume even that the heir will seek to dispose of
the stock at once. If we must speculate as to his intention it seems
reasonable to believe that his intention normally would be the same as
that of the decedent, who is unlikely to have invested in it primarily
71. Central Consumers Wine and Liquor Co., 1 B.T.A. 1190 (1925); William
H. Jackson Co., 2 B.T.A. 411 (1925).
72. See for example, Weber v. Rasquin, 101 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1939). Perhaps
the best known case supporting this view is Laird v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 598 (3d
Cir. 1935).
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with a view to what he could obtain in a forced liquidation.7 3  And
even if he did desire to liquidate, it is unreasonable to assume that he
would seek liquidation against the wishes of his fellow stockholders. It
is just as reasonable to assume that they would seek liquidation against
his opposition and it is most probable-because normally the most ad-
vantageous financially-that all the stockholders would agree on any
liquidation program. In either of the latter events, his minority inter-
est would certainly constitute no bar to establishing a dollar equivalent
for the stock on the basis of asset value. It is compounding specula-
tion first to assume that he will want to liquidate and then to assume
that he will be precluded from doing so by the opposition of the majority
stockholders.
Effect of restricted market. Two further arguments have been
advanced to qualify the proposed use of asset value as a formula. The
first is that close held stock is harder to sell than listed stock,74 and the
second is that the asset value formula makes no allowance for "block-
age"-a term which normally describes a lowering of stock values
concomitant with placing a large block of stock on the market."
Neither factor would be given weight under the proposed formula.
Both of these factors are, as a matter of theory, irrelevant to ar
inquiry-under the proposed formula-unrelated to the sale price of the
stock. Further, the rule respecting blockage is subject to the argu-
ments-rejected by some courts-that property in the hands of a small
owner is unjustly appraised at a higher figure than that of a large
owner; that all shares are necessarily of equal value; and that certainty
is abandoned for speculation. Some courts have refused to speculate
on the blockage issue, and have declined to approve application of the
theory on the ground that the restrictive effects of blockage have not
been demonstrated. 7' The rule in fact compels speculation to an exces-
sive degree. An initial speculation results in the somewhat violent
73. Compare Justice Holmes' comment in International Harvester Co. of Amer-
ica v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914), that value "is a fact and generally is more or
less easy to ascertain."
74. Cravens v. Welch, 10 F. Supp. 94 (S.D. Cal. 1935); Bourn v. McLaughlin,
19 F.2d 148 (N.D. Conn. 1927): Wood v. United States, 29 F. Suo. 853 (Ct.Cl.
1939); James P. Hooper. 41 B.T.A. 114 (1940): Elizabeth Bowen, P-H 1948 TC
MEm. DEC. 48,094 (1948). Compare John B. Bryan, P-H 1943 TC MEn. DEc.
1143,208 (1943) referring to a "ready though restricted market" among other mem-
bers of the family.
75. The major cases so holding with respect to stock valuation generally are
Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Helvering v. Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. of Baltimore, 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Laird v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d
598 (3d Cir. 1935); Daniel Guggenheim, 39 B.T.A. 251 (1939); Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937) ; Jacobine Fuller, P-H 1942 TC M1,i. DEc. ff 42,322
(1942).
76. Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d
490 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Groff v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 319 (D. Conn. 1940). See also James
Couzens, 11 B.TA. 1040 (1928). Appellate courts have also refused to overrule con-
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presumption that the owner of close held stock intends to sell at all; a
second, that he intends to dump it on the market rather than feed it ir,
slowly over a period of time; " and a third speculation seeks to measure
the effect on the market if the first two conjectures are correct.
The use of comparatives. The estate tax statute now provides in
substance that in establishing market value for close held stock the
stock values of comparable companies shall be considered with all other
relevant factors."' Basically this amounts to no more than an admoni-
tion to the Tax Court and the Commissioner not to ignore evidence
respecting this factor.79 Comparatives have been especially emphasized
in cases involving stocks for investment companies so and are given
considerable emphasis in valuation of the stock of operating companies
as well."' In some cases before the statute was adopted, the factor was
accorded little weight.8 2
In the interest of providing a more workable and equitable system
of translating property into dollar equivalents for Federal tax purposes,
this provision of the statute should be repealed. As in the case of any
one of the "other relevant factors," comparatives furnish only the most
speculative l3asis for a decision of the Tax Court. Under the present
theory, every "relevant factor" is weighed with respect to the company
issuing the stock to be valued. An informative comparison of that
company with other companies is an exceptionally exhausting and
highly speculative process. To illustrate, one company may have better
labor relations, more economical buying arrangements, a cheaper system
of distribution, lower labor costs, lower taxes, younger but more experi-
enced management, lower freight costs, a more experienced labor pool,
a more sound financial structure, a more stable history, better credit,
more diversified production, greater earnings, and a more conservative
clusions of the Tax Court respecting value. Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214
(10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645 (1942). See also Note, 94 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 365 (1946).
77. Compare the comments in Estate of Brittingham, P-H 1942 TC MEtM. Dr_.
fT 42,072 (1942).
78. I T. REv. CoDE § 811(k), quoted suipra note 5.
79. For an excellent analysis of recent cases under the statute see Powell, Vaiu.
ation cases: Practical Utility of Listed Comparatives under Recent Decisions, 6 PROC.
OF INsT. oN FED. TAx'x. 163 (1948). It has been suggested that notwithstanding
the statute, the Commissioner has not accorded proper weight to the factor. See Van
Dyke, Commissioner Unfair to Fair Market Value, 23 TAxEs 788 (1945).
80. Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866 (D. Conn. 1945) ; Horlick v.
Kuhl, 62 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Wis. 1945) and cases cited.
81. See Oxford Paier Co. v. United States, 52 F.2d 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1931), as
amended, 56 F.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1932) ; Blackard v. Jones, 62 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okla.
1944) ; Brown v. United States, 16 Am. FED. TAx REP. 1084 (1935) ; Drayton Coch-
ran, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEc. ff 48,094 (1948) ; Win. S. Cherry, P-H 1946 TC MEM.
DEc. IT 46,140 (1946) ; Lizzie F. Olney, P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEC. 46,138 (1946).
82. Rheinstrom v. Willcut, 26 F. Suop. 306 (D. Minn. 1938); Geo. D. Harter
Bank, 38 B.T.A. 387 (1938); James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928); Jacob Fish,
1 B.T.A. 882 (1925).
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dividend policy. Similar factors dealing with the "value" of each com-
pany could be multiplied. In theory every one of these and other
relevant factors is compared among several-in one case as many as
nine 8-companies to insure that the stock value of the comparatives
is in fact comparable. With respect to each of these factors, several
questions must be asked and answered as to each comparative. For
example: does the comparative company in fact have sounder labor
relations? If so, to what extent is that factor reflected in the value
of its stock? To what extent is the factor of less sound labor relations
reflected in the stock to be valued? How much more unsound, in terms
of dollar equivalents reflected in stock values, are the labor relations of
the latter as compared to the former, company? Theoretically, each of
these factors is weighed separately, and then the cumulative effect of all
the factors is weighed. Of course, this type of inquiry cannot go on if
the business of either the government or the taxpayer is to be trans-
acted. In practice, the Commissioner calls "experts" who support his
valuation, and the taxpayer calls "experts" who support his valuation.
The Tax Court makes some reference to the comparatives in its find-
ings and opinion, and expresses a decision based on "all relevant fac-
tors." Actually, the difficulties in determining the extent to which the
companies compared are in fact comparable are insurmountable.
Stocks subject to restrictions on sale. Courts have frequently held
that enforceable limitations respecting sale must be considered in estab-
lishing the "fair market value" of stock. Where the stock to be valued
is subject to an option to purchase, at any time, the value of the stock
clearly should not exceed the option price.8 4 Accordingly, the Commis-
sioner and the courts in such a case should use the option price instead
of asset value. This would be authorized under the hardship clause
of the formula.
On the other hand, restrictions on the sale of stock vary. In most
cases it is not clear that the effect of the restriction is to limit the value
of stock to a specific sum. For example, some cases have involved
options which enable the option holder to purchase stock at a stated
sum if the stockholder decides to sell 85 or terminates his employment
with the company."" In such cases it has been held that the restriction
83. Lizzie F. Olney, P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEc. 1146,138 (1946).
84. The courts have adopted this approach under the present valuation system.
Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936) ; Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639
(3d Cir. 1938) ; Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Wilson v. Bowers, 57
F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932) ; John Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938). Compare Kline v. Com-
missioner, 130 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942).
85. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943).
86. Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1944); Krauss v. U.S., 140
F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Kline v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942).
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is not controlling, but should be considered as a relevant factor in de-
termining the "value" of the stock."' In some cases involving absolute
restrictions on sale for a limited period of time, reliance has been placed
on net worth of assets to determine the value of the stock.88
The speculative nature of this approach to "value" is manifest.
The result may be illustrated by a case involving restrictions of by-laws,
where, upon termination of employment, an employee was obligated
to sell the stock at book value and the corporation was obligated to buy.
The appellate court said that this factor should have been considered
by the Tax Court in fixing "value":
We say nothing as to how the shares shall be appraised; that
is the Tax Court's duty, from any interference in which we must
rigidly abstain. It may come to the same conclusion after weigh-
ing all the relevant factors: the prospective earnings; the likelihood
that the donor would not retire; his expectancy of life; his power
to change the by-laws; his opportunity to sell, to another employee
-with the director's consent-; and any other factor which it
finds would contribute to, or detract from, the value. All we
decide is that it was, as a matter of law, erroneous to refuse to
consider any other factor than the book value at the time of the
gift; so far we understand we are obliged to go.89
The conjecture involved in such an inquiry makes impossible a
rational analysis of the dollar result. Use of a formula based on the
asset value of the stock would reach a generally equitable result with-
out such speculation. The result would be sound in practice because
directly related to the value of the stock to the holder; it would accord
with the theory of the formula, which excludes from consideration fac-
tors affecting sale price.
"FAIRNESS" UNDER PROPOSED FORMULA
Comparison with the current valuation process. The foregoing
discussion of blockage, business prospects and restrictive agreements
respecting the sale of close held stock is not intended to imply that the
existence of such factors bears no relevance to the "value" of the stock.
Obviously, if the stock to be valued represents a block readily market-
able, and subject to no restrictions respecting sale, the value of the
stock to the owner and the market price of the stock may be greater
87. See notes 85 and 86 supra. See also Newman v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 225,
rehearing denied, 41 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1930) ; Frederick A. Koch, 28 B.T.A. 363
(1933).
88. E. F. Simms, 28 B.T.A. 988 (1933); Wallis Tractor Co., 3 B.T.A. 981
(1925). But cf. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937).
89. Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F.2d 385, 386 (2d Cir. 1944).
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than a stock subject to contrary factors. Similarly, if any one of count-
less "other relevant factors" be shown to exist-such as sound financial
condition or excellent business prospects-the value of the stock to the
owner, and the market price of the stock, may be enhanced. The basic
premise which has supported the current system of translating close
held stock into dollar equivalents is that it is unfair to preclude the Com-
missioner and the courts from considering those circumstances in reach-
ing a decision. The basic difficulty with the current system is that it
assumes that the existence of these factors is capable of objective proof
and more particularly that an intelligent decision can be made as to the
extent that each of these factors influences the worth of the stock to the
taxpayer or the sum which he could obtain for it on the market. That
a decision respecting such factors must, as a matter of theory, be in-
tuitive to the point of speculation admits of no doubt. Litigants placing
their respective reams of evidence into the Tax Court hopper may
expect to find the finished product consisting of a result expressed in
terms of dollars, packaged in a conglomeration of facts. They will
look in vain for "law" in the sense of a predictable guide for the future
or a rationalization of all of the factors considered in the decision and
the weight accorded to each of them.
This result-which would be bad in any case-is particularly un-
fortunate where the process is directed to discovering the dollar equiv-
alent of property for purposes of Federal taxation. Taxation is not
concerned with the philosophical meaning of "value"; if government is
to go on, it cannot even be concerned with an absolute balance which
will insure that every taxpayer shall pay his exact proportion of the
cost of government. There is no such balance in a system under which
corporations must pay an income tax but partnerships and cooperatives
do not; where only one half of the total gain from capital assets held in
excess of six months is included in ordinary income, and all gain from
capital assets held less than six months is included in ordinary income.
There is no such balance in the valuation process itself. The market
price for stocks may be influenced by manic or depressive mass psy-
choses in Wall Street or Washington, unrelated to what many would
agree to be "value," but in most cases the market price nevertheless
controls the "value" for tax purposes. A reversionary or remainder
interest in an estate is valued on the basis of the mortality tables, not-
withstanding that a life estate may in fact be terminated one day or
(fifty years after the death of the decedent." The basis for these rules
. 90. It was held in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929) that
the value of a life estate must be determined on the basis of life expectancy at testa-
tor's death, notwithstanding that the life tenant died before the time for computing
the tax. Note also the frequently quoted opinion of Judge Frank in Commissioner
THE VALUATION OF CLOSE HELD STOCKS
is well established: from the standpoint of both the government and
the taxpayer, it may be more "fair" to settle these issues promptly by
application of a generally fair rule than to engage in unprofitable, ex-
pensive and administratively unwise attempts to obtain an exactly
proportionate division of the tax burden. As Justice Brandies once
suggested,"' it is sometimes more important to solve a problem than to
solve it right.
These observations apply particularly to the complaint sometimes
made informally by practitioners that stock without a market value is
currently valued by the Commissioner and the courts at a higher figure
than actually comparable stock valued on the basis of market quotations.
,It has not been demonstrated that this result is general: the nature of
the problem precludes a facile conclusion on the point. Practitioners
also complain that this result is reached because the Commissioner cur-
rently applies the net asset value formula to close held stock. The
accuracy of this statement may be equally difficult to demonstrate; but
it would not be surprising to find the Commissioner currently relying
on the net asset value formula at least to the extent that it provides a
relatively tangible guide to the establishment of value. The answer to
these criticisms is twofold. There is no lack of logic in a process which
reaches the dollar equivalent of stock by taking the market value where
one exists, and substituting the aliquot net asset value of the corpora-
tion where no market value is obtainable. And if it be assumed-as it
v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943 (2d Cir, 1942), holding that the actuarial method of valu-
ing remainders for gift tax purposes was "not so arbitrary as to be unreasonable and
invalid." The court said further: "It is immaterial that actuarial estimates may not
accord with realities. Few estimates of value do, whether used by courts or laymen:
For purposes of corporate reorganization, value, generally, is a reasonable capitaliza-
tion of future earnings as reasonably foreseeable at the date of reorganization; reli-
ance is had upon an educated guess or peering into the future, which, being a human
conjecture, may be wrong. No one can foretell what changes in technology will do
to the earnings of any business. Any one who wants to eliminate uncertainties from
'value' will have a sad time getting along in this world. All aspects of living are
chancy. We cannot, by the use of a symbol, 'value,' convert the risky into riskless-
ness, Canute restless change out of existence. Businessmen sometimes pay cash for
value which exists only in 'moonshine or dreamland.' . . . Accordingly, we reject
the argument that, merely because the 'value' of the contingent remainders, measured
actuarially, may be inaccurate, Congress must be deemed to have intended that such
remainders should not be subject to a gift tax." Of course, even under such a formula
the courts can avoid a clearly unjust result. See United States v. Provident Trust
Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934); Estate of Denbigh, 7 TC 387 (1946); 60 HARv. L. REv.
152 (1946).
We have recently relearned also that where a life estate is given to an individual
with the remainder over to charity, no deduction for the remainder is permissible
where the trustee is directed to invade the corpus to provide for the individual "in
such manner as she may desire." Henslee v. Union Planters National Bank and
Trust Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 290 (1949). In that case it was abundantly clear that there
was only the most remote possibility that the corpus would ever be impaired, but evi-
dence on this subject was held irrelevant on the authority of Merchants National
Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
91. Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting
opinion), ". . . in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right."
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has yet to be generally demonstrated-that the valuations thus made
are higher for close held stock than stock with a market value, this does
not demonstrate that either method is more "fair." In both cases the
dollar "value" is necessarily artificial; there is no magic in either in-
terpretation. There is in each interpretation, however, a maximum of
the kind of certainty and predictability by which men may be reasonably
guided in computing tax liability.
Further, it would be illusory to attempt to establish that the "fair"
answer was reached in any case or in any percentage of cases under
current methods of valuing close held stock, on whatever theory they
may have been decided. The fact is that there are no "right" answers,
A comparison of the values asserted by the Commissioner and the tax-
payers in a random selection of cases is printed in the margin.9 2 The
92. Comparison of values claimed by litigants in tax cases:
In re Nathan's Estate, 166 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1948)
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134
F2d 578 (lst Cir. 1943)
Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513 (3rd
Cir. 1937)
Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1935)
Robertson v. Routzaln, 75 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1935)
Newell v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.
1933)
Commissioner v. Johnson, 51 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir.
1931)
Phillips v. United States, 12 F.2d 598 (W.D. Pa.
1926), aff'd, 24 F.2d 195 (3rd Cir. 1928)
Horlick v. Kuhl, 62 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Wis. 1945)
Baker v. Hoey, 33 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1933)
Wood v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 853 (Ct. Cl.
1939)
Mary- E. Cook, 9 T.C. 563 (1947)
Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947)
Amy H. DuPuy, 9 T.C. 276 (1947)
Lelia E. Coulter, 7 T.C. 1280 (1946)
Augustus E. Staley, 41 B.T.A. 752 (1940)
Mathilde B. Hooper, 41 B.T.A. 114 (1940)
Mary A. Laird, 38 B.T.A. 926 (1938)
Geo. D. Harter Bank, 38 B.T.A. 387 (1938)
Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937)
Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 29 B.T.A. 376
(1933)
Jos. H. Holmes, 22 B.T.A. 757 (1931)
Win. Schoenheit, 14 B.T.A. 33 (1928)
James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928)
VALUATION
AssERTED By
TAXPAYER
$ 297.66
1,750.00
15A6
18.63
140.00
785.00
75.00
154.10
117.00
22.50
75.32
48.12
.50
58.50
129.00
750.00
79.68
56.50
20.00
60.00
20.00
758.00
6,046.00
50.00
5.00
30.00
150.00
160.00
58.72
VALUATION
AssERTE BY
COMISSIONER
$ 1,000.00
3,900.00
35.00
10.00
175.00
431.85
100.00
250.00
285.00
15.25
93.70
72.70
1.00
90.00
316.52
2,056.00
150.00
340.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
1,760.60
15,043.66
95.00
15.00
44.00
857.00
400.00
149.00
2,055.79 13,000.00
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figures represent the extremes claimed at different times during negotia-
tion and trial and may not be representative of the divergence of views
in cases which are not litigated. But assuming that neither party is
claiming a "value" beyond reasonable expectation of proof, the sum
claimed demonstrates that there is ample room for reasonable diver-
gence of opinion as to the "value" of any block of close held stock.
Except where some specific and recurring principle is involved, such
as blockage, it is impossible to demonstrate any real or fancied mis-
understanding of facts or economics in a decision. Accordingly, it is
impossible to establish that the decisions are either right or wrong.
Still less is it possible to demonstrate that the decisions have been more
"fair" than those which may be expected under the proposed formula.
It should, however, be noted that in several cases decided by the Tax
Court during recent years, a figure has been adopted which roughly
represents a mathematical compromise between the respective "values"
Justin Potter, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEc. 148,062
(1948)
Charles E. Kimball, P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEC.
ff 46,268 (1946)
Lizzie F. Olney, P-H 1946 TC MEa. DEC 1 46,138
(1946)
James Hogan, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC 144,109
(1944)
Sarah H. Bradley, P-H 1943 TC MEM:. DEC.
143,382 (1943)
L. J. Burda, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. 1 43,350
(1943)
Herbert L. Johnston, P-H 1943 TC MEar. DEC.
11 43,296 (1943)
John B. Bryan, P-H 1943 TC Mzax. DEC. 1 43,208
(1943)
Hettie M. Stroh, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC.
143,031 (1943)
Herman B. Good, P-H 1942 TC MEm. DEC.
42,529 (1942)
Rathbun Fuller, P-H 1942 TC MEM. DEC.
11 42,443 (1942)
Harold H. Brittingham, P-H 1942 TC MEm. DEC.
11 42,072 (1942)
Reba S. Buchanan, P-H 1941 BTA MEm. DEC.
1 41,091 (1941)
John B. Waterman, P-H 1941 BTA MEm. DEC.
11 41,551 (1941)
Frederick J. Kieser, P-H 1940 BTA MEm. DEC.
1 40,240 (1940)
Margaret Russell Vail, P-H 1940 BTA MEm.
DEC. 1 40,431 (1940)
Victor A. Machris, P-H 1938 BTA MEm. DEC.
11 38,076 (1938)
VALUATION
AssERTED By
TAXPAYER
25.00
3.00
1.39
15.00
100.00
676.00
1,125.00
121.00
3.00
31.00
50.00
381.56
90.00
35.00
50.00
423.12
160.00
42.50
50.00
53.35
221.25
VALUATION
ASSERTED BY
COMMISSIONER
90.00
75.00
4.00
22.50
350.00
1,100.00
2,100.00
430.00
10.00
50.00
75.00
620.40
150.00
135.00
75.00
625.00
478.00
100.00
120.00
152.42
341.19
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claimed by the Commissioner and the taxpayer. 3 The results were
unquestionably reached after weighing of the evidence. And, as the
Tax Court has reminded us, a decision has to be made somehow. But,
particularly in the absence of a rationalization for the result, the cases
can scarcely be said to demonstrate that decisions under the present
process are more "fair" than decisions would be under the proposed
formula.
Moreover, the "value" of stock today has been thought to depend
on the prospects for tomorrow. Management which is poor today may
be competent tomorrow; competition may increase or lessen; markets
may broaden or contract; the ratio of current assets to current lia-
bilities may change; the business outlook may grow more dim or bright.
Thus "value" in fact is determined by the future, and every decision is
based-at least in theory-on what the future holds for the corpora-
tion which issued the stock to be valued. Notwithstanding the gran-
diose claims of the broker's tip sheet, prescience of this sort is not given
to man; but under the present valuation process it is mandatory that
the litigants aspire to it and that the Tax Court attain it as best it can.
This type of prediction should be the last-not the first-resort in the
search for a fair and efficient system of tax administration.
CONCLUSION
Any formula proposed must rest primarily on what is "fair."
The exact content of any formula suggested is accordingly debatable.
Various modifications in the formula proposed may well be thought
desirable by different persons. Changes in the formula may be neces-
sary to make it more palatable to Congress or those who influence legis-
lation on the subject. Certainly no formula should be so burdened with
multiple factors that a determination of "value" would remain as sub-
jective as it is at present. Subject to this limitation the exact nature
and scope of the formula can safely be left to legislative determination.
It is submitted, however, that the formula proposed represents a
.93. Comparison of values asked by litigants and given by Tax Court:
VALUATION VALUATION VALUATION
ASSERTED BY AssERTED BY FOUND BY
TAXPAYER COMMISSIONER TAX COURT
Mary E. Cook, 9 T.C. 563 (1947) $ 58.50 $ 90.00 $ 75.00
Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947) 129.00 316.52 245.00
Amy H. DuPuy, 9 T.C. 276 (1947) 750.00 2,056.00 1,300.00
Lelia E. Coulter, 7 T.C. 1280 (1946) 79.68 150.00 90.00
Lizzie F. Olney, P-H 1946 TC MaF.
DEc. 46,138 (1946) 676.00 1,100.00 855.00
Hettie M. Stroh, P-H 1943 TC MEL!.
DEC. 43,031 (1943) 381.56 620.40 465.00
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reasonable approach to the problem of valuation. It is sufficiently flex-
ible so that it will not become "a doctrine so enamoured of accuracy"
that the Commissioner and the Tax Court must abdicate the function of
decision. At the same time, it has the undoubted virtue that it will
canalize the investigation of "value." Instead of consulting "all relevant
factors" the Tax Court will consider the single factor most relevant to
a fair and efficient system of tax administration. The taxpayer and the
Commissioner, knowing the issues to be determined, may more readily
present evidence directed to specific issues, determinable by specific
provisions of the statute and regulations. While the ultimate deter-
mination will remain subjective in the sense that a subjective process is
involved in measuring any set of facts by a rule of law, a rational state-
ment of the exact bases for the decision may be expected and required.
Litigants will know more of why they won or lost their cases; the Tax
Court itself may begin to build a more orderly and concrete legal struc-
ture for the guidance of the public. The presumption supporting the
findings of the Commissioner may be weighed against the statutory
directions for determining "value," and the determination of the Tax
Court may be measurable by a yardstick of law rather than weighing
the speculative decision of the Tax Court against the intuitive decision
of the appellate court. The adoption of a measurable policy will insure
more consistent valuations throughout the various offices of the Bureau;
settlements without litigation will be facilitated where the issues are
known. The delays, expense and uncertainties incident to the present
valuation process will be reduced.
The interests of the taxpayers and the government alike require
a change.
